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We introduce a modeling framework called Transaction Cost Economics to help decision makers 
in rural health care markets choose among alternative organizational relationships in order to 
more cost-effectively deliver healthcare services.    In particular, the hospital-physician 
relationship is analyzed and the transactional attributes, institutional environment, and market 
characteristics are identified as key variables influencing the organizational relationship between 
hospital and physician.  As asset specific investments are made by either the hospital or 
physician, vertically integrated relationships are more likely to occur.  The degree of remoteness 
of rural areas is also considered to affect the impact of these asset-specific investments. 
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Access to health care in rural markets has been studied at length (Bull et al., 2001).  The 
majority of studies have examined access to health services for children (Goodman et al., 1992), 
adults with disabilities (Lishner et al, 1996), and more generally barriers that prevent a wide 
variety of rural residents from health care services (Edelman et al., 1996).  More recently, 
research has focused on how health markets have been organized to provide greater access to 
health care for rural residents by examining the degree of vertical integration of services in rural 
hospitals (Mick et al, 1993) and the possible impact new rural health networks may have on 
improving access to health services in rural settings (Minyard et al., 2003).  This paper builds on 
these organizational studies on access to care in rural settings by introducing a new economic 
organization framework which can be used to examine issues of organization and access to 
health care services in rural settings.   
We begin by introducing rural health researchers to a rapidly evolving field within  
economics that studies vertical and horizontal boundaries of firms called transaction cost 
economics (TCE).  We explain the theoretical framework of TCE, how scholars in previous 
studies have conducted empirical tests of TCE’s main organization hypothesis, and the empirical 
challenges of conducting this type of research.  As an example of TCE’s usefulness, we examine 
the vertical boundaries between primary care physicians and rural hospitals to identify some 
TCE-organization hypotheses that could be tested.  We conclude by highlighting other possible 
applications of TCE in rural health markets.  The explication and application of TCE to the study 
of health services in rural markets charts a new rural health research agenda, one in which we 
hope many will choose to participate. 
Transaction Cost Theory 
   2 
The origins of the Transaction Cost Theory can be traced back to some of the early 
writings of the Nobel Price winning economist, Ronald Coase (1937).  Coase was interested in 
answering the question of why the firm existed.  The modern empirical application of TCE to 
organization is credited to Oliver Williamson.  Williamson’s working hypothesis was that 
economic organization occurs to “align transactions, which differ in their atributes, with 
governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, 
transaction cost economizing) way” (Williamson 1991, p. 79).  Here, governance structures are 
the alternative forms of organizational arrangement.  For Coase, the alternative forms of 
organization were the two extremes of either an arm’s length spot market transaction or a 
transaction internalized (made) within the firm.  Williamson, in his later writings expands on the 
number of governance structure  (organizational arrangement)  alternatives from simply market 
transactions and internal organization to include additional hybrid forms.  These hybrid forms 
may include more market-like transactions such as short-term and informal contracts as well as 
forms that are more similar to internal organization such as long-term contracts,  partial 
ownership agreements, franchises, networks, alliances, and firms with highly decentralized 
assignments of decision rights (Klein 2004).  Organizational forms most similar to market 
transactions include transaction costs of discovering relevant prices and negotiating and 
enforcing contracts.  Organizational forms similar to internal organization address tansaction 
costs of information flow, incentives, monitoring and measuring performance evaluation (Klein). 
Behavioral Assumptions and the Holdup Problem 
 
Two behavioral assumptions underly Williamson’s TCE framework.  The first assumption is 
that individuals have bounded rationality, or in the words of Herbet Simon (1992), individuals 
are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.”  Individuals cannot comprehend and compute all   3 
of the information available to them from which to determine how to organize a transaction.  
Second, Willimson assumes that individuals possess opportunism, here defined as self-interest 
seeking with guile.  Individuals will be willing to take advantage of transactional attributes in 
order to increase their barganing power in negotiating a transaction ex ante or the incompleteness 
of a contract in order to re-negotiate the contract ex-post. 
Given these behavioral assumptions, one of the issues Willimason addresses in his 
articulation of transaction cost theory is how parties to a transaction address what he defines as 
the “holdup” problem (Williamson 1975, 1985).  The holdup problem occurs when one or both 
parties must make relationship-specific investments in order for the transaction to occur.  When 
only one party must make these investments ex-ante, that party exposes themselves to a potential 
hazard or risk ex-post.  That is, the other party may take advantage of the relationship-specific 
investment of the former party by acting opportunistically and changing the terms of the 
transaction ex-post.  Because it is difficult to identify all potential opportunistic behaviors as a 
contract is being negotiated, any contract agreed to is incomplete and  a contracting party that 
must make a relationships-specific investment puts itself at risk from the incompleteness of the 
contract.  Williamson posits that when a party has this level of asset specific investment in a 
transaction, rather than deal with the hazards of an incomplete contract, the party with that up-
front investment should simply internalize the transaction within the firm. 
Transaction Cost Economics and Health Care Markets: A Review of Studies 
 
      Several studies have examined how vertical relations affect the performance of 
organizations operating in health care markets.  For example, some studies have examined the 
performance of hospitals and managed care organizations.  A large majority of studies have 
examined how hospitals can improve performance (Estaugh, 1992); the role of alternative   4 
business expansion strategies have on performance (Gillard, 1998); the determinants of 
profitability for hospitals (Langland-Orban et al 1993; Gapenski et al 1999); and why 
performance varies between non-profit and for-profit hospitals (Rosenau 2003).  Finally, Gaynor 
et al. (2004) examined how physician incentives in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
affected medical expenditures.  However, little is known about the causal factors which lead to 
increased vertical integration within health care markets (Gaynor and Wilson, 1999).  Of these 
few studies, only a few have examined contractual arrangements from a hospital perspective.  
Studies by Alexander et al. (1996), Morrisey et al. (1999), and Esposto (2004) examined why 
hospitals choose different contractual arrangements with physicians.  Some scholars have begun 
applying TCE to understand vertical relations between hospitals and physicians, but these studies 
feature the use of case studies and descriptive analysis of relations rather than empirical testing 
TCE hypotheses.
1  However, only three studies have used TCE reasoning to explain why vertical 
integration may be preferred when hospitals organize medical (e.g., physicians) and non-medical 
services (e.g., housecleaning and food).  In what follows, we review these studies in detail to 
explain how TCE research has been conducted in health care markets.   
  Three studies have empirically tested the central TCE hypothesis in health care markets.
  
For example, Coles and Hesterly (1998a) examined how public and private hospitals choose their 
vertical boundaries regarding medical and non-medical services. They examined vertical 
integration of medical services including respiratory therapy, laboratory, radiology, physical 
therapy, outpatient services, emergency room and pharmacy.  Non-medical services included 
housekeeping, laundry, food services, computer services, maintenance and landscaping.  Coles 
and Hesterly asked hospital administrators to complete a survey which measured whether these 
services were outsourced, performed in-house, or not provided as an empirical measure of   5 
vertical integration.  They measured physical and human asset specificity and technological 
uncertainty as being the primary transaction costs variables of importance when hospitals chose 
to integrate both medical and non-medical services.  Using a sample of 13 transactions in 196 
hospitals, which produced over 2500 observations, Coles and Hesterly found general support for 
the central vertical integration-asset specificity hypothesis.  In particular, they concluded that 
firm-specific training time (human asset specificity), technological uncertainty, and economies of 
scale were fundamentally important when integrating these services.  Coles and Hesterly 
measured technological uncertainty using a scale ranging between infrequently to very 
frequently regarding the introduction of new methods or technologies.  As new methods and 
technologies were introduced, uncertainty increased.  Likewise, they also measured economies of 
scale as the number of beds.  This variable was a proxy for service capacity, or firm size.  Results 
indicated the larger the hospital, the more likely outsourcing of non-medical services would 
occur; this is because outsourcing using market contracting for services is possible more so in 
larger, markets (Lyons, 1995).  However, results also indicated larger hospitals were more likely 
to offer physician services in-house. 
Coles and Hesterly (1998a) reasoned their results also indicated hospitals had an even 
stronger incentive to integrate medical services in an effort to control quality of patient 
treatment.  Thus, hospitals opted to integrate medical services which were used during critical 
stages of patient care (radiology, emergency room, etc.).  Based on TCE, this implies the costs of 
outsourcing would exceed integration: if a hospital outsourced for medical services the 
likelihood of hold-up would be significantly higher.  The remedy according to TCE would be for 
hospitals to provide these services in-house to maintain superior quality of care of patients.  
Otherwise, hospitals could become locked-in to inferior technologies needed for patient care,   6 
which would place them at a competitive disadvantage.  The study by Coles and Hesterly 
(1998a) represents one of the broadest empirical tests of TCE while controlling for a number of 
important factors such as economies of scale, market size, and the types of liability associated 
with medical versus non-medical services.   
  In a slightly different study, Coles and Hesterly (1998b) examined the choice to integrate 
medical (e.g., radiology and pharmacy) and non-medical (e.g., housekeeping and landscaping) 
services.  However, this study focused two different and important areas in TCE research.  First, 
they examined differences in vertical integration between public and private hospitals when 
integrating these services.  Their results indicated private hospitals were more sensitive to 
efficiency pressures of competition.  In fact, Coles and Hesterly (1998b) concluded: “These 
differing incentives [between public and private hospital ownership] create a situation where 
other forces, be they political or other non-economic forces, have a greater impact on the 
integration decision than do transaction costs” (p. 407).  The second important area of new 
research provided by Coles and Hesterly (1998b) was the more explicit examination of 
interaction effects between technological uncertainty and measures of physical and human asset 
specificity.  The probability of integrating medical services increased substantially by adding 
these interaction effects and improved the power of empirical tests of transaction cost theory.  
    The early studies by Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) represent the first attempts to apply 
TCE to explain vertical integration of services in health care markets.  Building on these seminal 
works, the study by Esposto (2004) provides the first and only study where TCE was applied 
specifically to the hospital-physician relationship.  That is, Esposto examined which 
organizational (or governance) structures hospitals chose when employing physicians—the 
integration of the physician services transaction.  However, Esposto’s study differed in two   7 
important respects.  First, empirical proxies of human or physical asset specificity were not 
measured.  Instead, a measure known as the case-mix index was used to approximate the degree 
of complexity associated with performing the average procedure by physicians.
2  The higher the 
value of the case-mix index, the greater the complexity of the average procedure performed by a 
physician.  The measure of complexity represents a proxy on the likelihood a physician may act 
opportunistically toward the hospital and the usage of its resources. 
  The second contribution of the Esposto (2004) study was a more refined empirical 
examination of the choices available to hospitals when employing physicians.  The simple 
‘make-or-buy’ decision, where ‘make’ referred to in-house production and ‘buy’ referred to 
outsourcing, was replaced with a range of available governance choices identified by Alexander 
et al. (1996).  Using governance choices of physician-hospital organization (PHO), management 
services organization (MSO), foundation and integrated salaried-staff model, Esposto (2004) 
hypothesized that the choice among these governance structures was a function of complexity-
uncertainty (the case-mix index), hospital characteristics such as public-private ownership, 
market share, and market characteristics such as a HMO penetration rate, population, average 
household income, physician density per 1000 population, and the percent of population equal to 
or over age 65.  Results indicated a positive relationship between the case-mix index and 
organizational structures where hospitals have greater internal control.  That is, hospitals opted to 
integrate or employ the services of physicians using a salaried-staff arrangement as complexity 
increased more so than using governance structures with fewer controls over hospital resource 
usage (e.g., PHO, MSO joint ventures).         
The early studies by Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) and Esposto (2004) have begun 
the empirical testing work of TCE in health care markets.  However, there is an absence of   8 
research applying TCE to understand hospital-physician relations in settings where regulation or 
other non-economic factors may influence governance choices, such as in rural health markets.  
The only mention of rural hospitals and governance choice was in the Coles and Hesterly 
(1998a) study: “Small hospitals are generally located in more rural areas, where there may be 
only one hospital for hundreds of miles.  Larger hospitals, however, are located in urban areas 
where there may be a number of other large hospitals located in close proximity.  In the case of 
small hospitals geographical isolation means that a contractor would not be in a position to take 
advantage of the economies of servicing a number of similar firms” (p. 342).  The implication is 
rural hospitals will be more likely to integrate, or choose governance structures with more 
vertical control over physicians, in an effort to control quality of patient care.  But to our 
knowledge, there has not been a study which has examined hospital-physician relations in rural 
health markets.  Would TCE equally do well at predicting optimal governance structures for 
rural hospitals?    In the next section, we explain an action plan rural health researchers can 
follow to begin TCE empirical work in rural health markets.  
Applying Transaction Cost Economics in Rural Health Markets 
 
Our action plan for explaining how rural health researchers can apply TCE in rural health 
markets has four important areas which require further development in this paper.  First, we need 
to concisely identify the types of dependent, independent and other control variables that can be 
used when conducting empirical tests of TCE.  To do this, we draw from Coles and Hesterly 
(1998a, 1998b) and Esposto (2004) and identify reasonable approaches for ascertaining measures 
of vertical integration, attributes of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency), 
controls, and other variables that might affect the rural hospital-physician relationship (e.g., 
government programs or changes in payment systems).  We also list other variables that might   9 
affect rural hospital-physician relations and therefore TCE’s predictive power.  For example, 
when determining if a rural hospital should vertically integrate physician services using one or 
more governance choices, other political or non-economic variables should be included in the 
empirical specifications (Coles and Hesterly, 1998a). 
Selecting Empirical Proxies for Transaction Cost Theory 
 
One of the formidable challenges when conducting TCE research is the selection of the 
appropriate empirical proxies that correspond to the core tenets of transaction cost theory.  To 
provide some guidance, we explain how Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) and Esposto (2004) 
conducted their empirical tests of TCE.  These three studies, though similar, provide alternative 
approaches for measuring dependent (vertical integration) and independent (attributes of 
transactions) variables using survey and secondary data sources.  The review below, we only 
focus on most important variables in these specifications, which are those that are most related to 
measures of vertical integration and asset specificity—the core  tenets of transaction cost theory.  
We conclude by also highlighting other important empirical proxies for variables that should be 
included when applying TCE in rural health markets. 
Dependent Variables 
 
  Based on Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) and Esposto (2004), a variety of approaches 
have been used to measure vertical integration in health care markets according to transaction 
cost theory.  The studies by Coles and Hesterly used a survey and asked hospital administrators 
if medical and non-medical services were performed using: (a) contracts; (b) in-house; or (c) not 
performed.  The advantage of this approach is its simplicity.  Hospital administrators can relate 
to this question while at the same time clear vertical boundaries of operations can be assessed.  
The disadvantage of this approach is when hospital administrators chose (a) we do not observe   10 
the details of those contracts, which means our ability to understand the type of ‘buy’ decision 
from the market is limited.  The same can be said of choice (b) in that we do not know the exact 
form of the in-house employee-employer arrangement.   
However, the Esposto (2004) study provides significant detail on the types of vertical 
arrangements between hospitals and physicians.  Esposto explained there are four types of 
arrangements based on the work of Alexander et al. (1996).  To begin, consider the most basic 
relationship between hospital and physician: the integrated salary arrangement (table one).  Here, 
the hospital employs the services of the physician to provide health services according to 
surrounding demand for services, such as primary care.  The physician agrees to the employment 
contract-arrangement and therefore allocates the majority of authority and residual control to the 
hospital concerning the use of hospital or system assets.  The physician also makes what 
Williamson (1985) calls human specific investments with the hospital -- the use of the 
physician’s knowledge when treating patients.  However, the hospital also makes physical and/or 
site specific investments with the physician.  The physician may provide treatment knowledge 
while the hospital provides lab, pharmacy or other services at a location near by (site specificity).  
In addition, the hospital also makes physical asset specific investments in that if physicians need 
specialized equipment for treating patients, the most likely case is those physical assets will be 
purchased by the hospital and made available for use by physicians.  Thus, the integrated salary 
arrangement closely approximates what Williamson (1985) refers to as hierarchical or internal 
control: the hospital makes services internally through this arrangement with a physician rather 
than using some type of market contracting or outsourcing arrangement.  From the hospital 
perspective, the integrated salaried (hierarchical) choice would be the preferred mode of 
organization give that the hospital has made significant human, physical and site specific asset   11 
investments—a high asset specificity condition which favors greater vertical control according to 
TCE. 
  At the other end of the vertical integration spectrum, we have the hospital-physician 
arrangement called foundation (Alexander et al. 1996).  Here, the physician remains in a legally 
separate entity from the hospital.  The hospital contracts for services depending on the volume of 
surrounding demand for services.  Thus, authority or residual control over the use of physician 
knowledge for services and hospital assets is not shared.  Instead, both parties make decisions in 
an autonomous manner.  However, only the terms of the contract explain in detail this 
arrangement, but the idea is the physician and hospital use this arrangement to gain the greatest 
ability to adapt to changes in market conditions or patient needs.  From the hospital perspective, 
the foundation arrangement choice would be the preferred mode of organization given that the 
hospital does not make significant human, physical and site specific asset investments—a low 
asset specificity condition which has less vertical control according to TCE.  According to 
Williamson (1985), there are also hybrid forms of organization where asset specific investments 
can be made by both parties.  This relationship is represented by the PHO and MSO 
arrangements where authority or residual control is shared and each party makes human, physical 
or site specific investments in the relationship.  The hospital may provide the equipment, 
buildings and medical staff to the physician in exchange for treatment services.  The physician 
may also agree to refer patients only to the hospital specified in the contract thereby excluding 
other hospitals from his services. 
[Table 1 Here] 
Independent Variables 
   12 
While some variation exists when measuring hospital-physician arrangements, perhaps 
the most challenging empirical task is to identify the appropriate proxies for alternative measures 
of asset specificity (site, physical, dedicated or human).  Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) 
developed proxies for human and physical asset specificity.  Following the work of Anderson 
and Weitz (1986), they use the length of time it takes to train an individual with previous 
experience in another firm as a proxy for human asset specificity.  Using a survey, Coles and 
Hesterly asked hospital administrators how long it would take an individual with previous 
experience in the service at another hospital to achieve satisfactory performance level in the 
respondent’s hospital.  This represented firm-specific training time in their specifications.  
Following the work of Jacobsen (1988), they also measured physical asset specificity, which 
represented the firm-specific nature of investments made in equipment and facilities.  They asked 
hospital administrators how much of the equipment in a department is not routinely used in the 
provision of the service at other hospitals (e.g., equipment for heart transplants).   
  While Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) developed proxies for asset specificity, Esposto 
(2004) did not.  Instead, he examined the complex nature of the average procedure provided by 
hospitals as a proxy for complexity—the case-mix index.  Complexity implies there is some type 
of tacit knowledge which is difficult to transfer to others in the routine practice of treating 
patients.  For example, a surgical operation on a patient’s brain is generally considered more 
complex than a hip or knee replacement.  The complexity brings with it the risk of failure and the 
potential for significant costs to both physician and hospital.  Estposto (2004) concluded: “the 
case-mix index should provide some evidence on whether a hospital’s exposure to the risk of 
physician opportunistic behavior is a valid explanation of the changes in the economic 
relationship between physicians and hospitals” (p. 56).  The idea is the higher the value of the   13 
case-mix index, the more complex the average procedure performed.  The greater the case-mix 
index, the more likely vertical structures such as the integrated salaried arrangement would be 
the optimal governance structure chosen.   
Rural Health Policy Variables 
 
  While the studies by Coles and Hesterly (1998a, 1998b) and Esposto (2004) provide 
empirical proxies for right-hand-side variables associated with asset specificity and complexity, 
rural health researchers should also consider additional controls related policies that affect the 
performance of rural hospitals.  For example, if estimating the degree of vertical integration 
between hospitals and physicians in rural markets, scholars would also control for any changes in 
what Williamson (1991) calls the institutional environment.  In rural health markets, this may 
correspond to whether the rural hospital has converted to critical access status.  Critical access 
status brings with it additional revenue enhancing benefits, which may affect a rural hospital’s 
ability to chose among different arrangements with physicians.  Other changes in Medicare and 
Medicaid policies could also affect the hospital business model enough to alter the decision to 
integrate physician services using PHO, MSO, salaried or foundation arrangements in rural 
health markets.  These are only a few examples of how changes in the institutional environment 
affect the choice of governance structure between physicians and hospitals in rural health 
markets.  Other examples abound and should be incorporated when empirically estimating the 
choice of governance form between physicians and hospitals in rural health markets.   
Estimation of Econometric Models 
 
  In real-world application, transaction costs are difficult to observe.  As an alternative 
approach, empirical applications of TCE developed a reduced form analysis where the attributes 
of the transaction predicted the unobservable costs of the transaction.  TCE empiricists assume   14 
that organizations have a goal of minimizing transactions costs, and therefore, the organizational 
form actually chosen by the firm represents the transaction-cost minimizing choice.  Hence, a 
reduced form version is estimated by 
(1)  e X G + = a * ; 
where X represents a vector of attributes of the transaction,  a is vector of parameters for the 
transaction attributes, and e represents the disturbance vector. 
The most basic  of reduced form analysis occurs when the dependent variable, governance 
choice, can be only one of two alternatives: internal organization (G=1), or market transaction 
(G=0).  In cases where the dependent variable takes on only two distinct values, the probit model 
or other appropriate qualitative choice model is most often applied
3.  
We propose to develop a TCE model to identify the optimal hospital-physician 
relationship for rural hospitals in the U.S. using secondary data from public and private sources.  
We propose a model similar to the one developed by Esposto (2004).  In the model, the 
dependent variable is the physical-hospital organizational arrangement.  These include the 
Physician-Hospital Organization (PHO), Management and Services Organization (MSO), 
Independent Practice Association (IPA), Integrated Salary Model, and all other physician-
hospital organizational arrangements.  
  The physician-hospital organizational arrangement is a function of the asset specificity, 
complexity, as well as market characteristics hypothesized by Robinson (1997) where the 
hospital-physician organization (HPO) is determined by  
(2)   HPO = f (Asset Specificity, Complexity, Market Characteristics). 
Complexity in the hospital-physician relationship would be measured by two variables, 
the hospital’s case mix and the number of services provided by the hospital.  As both the case   15 
mix and facility code count increase, it is assumed that an increase in the complexity of the 
transactions between the physician and hospital occurs.  It is expected as the case mix and 
facility code count increase, the probability of a tighter physician-hospital relationship increases. 
Further, both Esposto (2004) and Robinson (1997) recognize additional market 
characteristics  impact the physician-hospital organizational arrangement.  A number of these 
characteristics will be added to the model to serve as controls on the reduced-form TCE model.  
The county HMO penetration rate (the percent of a county’s population covered by an HMO 
plan) will be used as a proxy to identify the level of risk contracting and other cost control 
incentives generated by managed care organizations.  It is expected as the HMO-penetration rate 
increases, tighter physician-hospital organization will occur as hospitals identify alternative 
organizational arrangements to control cost.  The distance to nearest hospital and number of beds 
x miles from the hospital will also be added control variables.  It is expected that as the number 
of beds x miles from the hospital increases, the probability of tighter physical-hospital 
organization increases as hospitals have to compete for physician loyalty in admissions.  
Likewise, as distance to the nearest hospital increases, the lower the likelihood that a physician 
would switch to another hospital in admitting patients would occur.  Hence, as the distance to the 
nearest hospital increases, the lower the probability of tighter physician-hospital organization. 
Also included in the model are dummy variables to control for specific hospital 
characteristics.  These include dummy variables for whether or not the hospital is for-profit,  
whether or not the hospital is part of a health care system or network, and the number of 
physicians per 1,000 residents in the county.  Based on evidence from Esposto, non-profit 
hospitals would be more likely to tightly integrate with physicians in order to effectively and 
efficiently meet their historical role of providing health care to low income communities.    16 
Hospitals that are a part of a health care system or network may have additional economies of 
scale that would spread out the fixed internal costs of monitoring transactions within the network 
leading to a higher probability of hospital-physician integration. Further as the number of 
physicians increased for a given population, the increased competition for patients would create 
incentives for physicians to reduce uncertainty and align themselves more tightly with hospitals. 
Concluding Remarks 
TCE has become the dominant industrial organization approach in organizational 
economics.  However, few studies have applied TCE in health markets.  Furthermore, there has 
not been a study that has examined vertical integration in rural health markets. To begin this 
work, we have developed an action plan or a ‘how to’ approach rural health researchers can 
follow.  We believe many more applications of TCE can be made in health markets (urban and 
rural alike) to improve our understanding of optimal organization.  We believe this is necessary 
to assist rural hospitals when choosing the appropriate hospital-physician arrangements.  This is 
necessary so rural hospitals can continue to provide vital health services to rural residents.  We 
also believe TCE can be applied to explain other vertical arrangements in health markets in 
general and in rural settings in particular.  Future work will be devoted to applying TCE to study 
vertical boundaries of nursing homes, community health center services (primary care, dental, 
mental and pharmacy), rural health clinics and managed care organizations (HMOs and PPOs).
                                                 
1 Our focus in this review is on empirical tests of TCE.  For reviews of hospital-physician arrangements in the U.S., see Snail and 
Robinson (1998) and Lake et al. (2003); also see Casalino and Robinson (2003) for an excellent discussion of how TCE explains 
risking contracting between hospitals and physicians.  However, these studies do not empirically test TCE hypotheses.  For this 
reason, we review only those articles where TCE hypotheses have been tested so rural health researchers have some idea of the:  
(a) proxies used to capture vertical integration, asset specificity, and other important control variables; (b) statistical models used 
such as probit and logit models; and (c) empirical challenges ahead that rural health researchers must manage to conduct this type 
of research.  
2 Esposto (2004) used the case mix index which was estimated by the Health Care Finance Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
3 The logistic regression model is another qualitative choice model often applied to the binary dependent variable case.  In cases 
where more than two alternative organizational forms are chosen, a multinomial probit or logit model is often applied. References 
Alexander, J.A., T. Vaughn, L.R. Burns,  H.S. Zuckerman, R.M. Anderson, P. Torrens, and 
D.W. Hilderman. Organizational approaches to integrated health care delivery: A 
taxonomic analysis of physician-organization arrangements. Medical Care Research and 
Review. 1996; 53(1): 71-93. 
 
Bull, C.N., J.A. Krout, E. Rathbone-McCuan, and M.J. Shreffler. Access and issues of equity  
  in remote/rural areas. Journal of Rural Health. 2001; 17(4), 356-359. 
 
Casalino, L. and J.C. Robinson. Alternative models of hospital-physician affiliation as the United 
States moves away from tight managed care. The Milbank Quarterly. 2003; 81(2): 331-350. 
 
Coase, R.H. The Nature of the Firm, in idem, The Firm, the Market and the Law.  
  Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1937. 
 
Coles, J.W., and W.S. Hesterly. Transaction costs, quality, and economies of scale: examining 
contracting choices in the hospital industry. Journal of Corporate Finance. 1998a; 4: 
321-345. 
 
Coles, J.W., and W.S. Hesterly. The impact of firm-specific assets and the interaction of  
  uncertainty: an examination of the make or buy decisions in public and private hospitals.  
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 1998b; 36: 383-409. 
 
Edelman, M.A., and B.L. Menz. Selected comparisons and implications of a national rural  
  and urban survey on health care access, demographics, and policy issues. Journal of  
  Rural Health. 1996; 12(3), 197-205. 
 
Esposto, A.G. Contractual integration of physician and hospital services in the U.S.  
  Journal of Management and Governance. 2004; 8: 49-69. 
 
Estaugh, S. Hospital strategy and financial performance. Health Care Management 
  Review. 1992; 17(1): 27-33. 
 
Gapenski L, W.B. Vogel , and B. Langland-Orban. The determinants of hospital profitability.  
  Hospital and Health Services Administration. 1999; 38: 63-80. 
 
Gaynor, M., J.B. Rebitzer, and L.J. Taylor. Physician incentives in health  
  maintenance organizations.  Journal of Political Economy. 2004; 112(4): 915-931. 
 
Gillard, D.J. A structural equation approach for topic strategic groups, Competitive Strategies 
and Performance: A Hospital Analysis. 1998; Dissertation, Arizona State University. 
 
Goodman, D.C., R.A. Barff, and E.S.  Fisher. Geographic barriers to child health services  
  in rural northern New England: 1980 to 1989. Journal of Rural Health. 1992; 8(2), 106- 
  113.   18 
 
Klein, P.G. "The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies" (April  
  2004). CORI Working Paper No. 04-07. http://ssrn.com/abstract=529962 
 
Lake, T. K., L. Devers, L. Brewster, and L. Casalino. Something old, something new: Recent  
  developments in hospital-physician relationships. Health Services Research. 2003; 38(1),  
  Part II: 471-488.   
 
Langland-Orban, B., L. Gapenski, and W.B. Vogel, Differences in characteristics of  
  hospitals with sustained high and sustained low profitability. Hospital and Health  
  Services Administration. 1993; 41(3): 385-399. 
 
Lishner, D.M., M. Richardson, P. Levine, and D. Patrick. Access to primary health care  
  among persons with disabilities in rural areas: A summary of the literature. Journal of  
  Rural Health. 1996; 12(1), 45-53. 
 
Lyons, B.R. Specific investment, economies of scale, and the make-or-buy decision: A  
  test of transaction cost theory. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 1995;  
  26: 431–43. 
 
Mick, S.S., L.L. Morlock, D. Salkever, G. de Lissovoy, F.E. Malitz, C.G. Wise, and 
  A.S. Jones. Horizontal and vertical integration-diversification in rural hospitals: A  
  national study of strategic activity, 1983-1988. Journal of Rural Health. 1993; 9(2), 99- 
  119. 
 
Minyard, K.J., I.C. Lineberry, T.A. Smith, and T. Byrd-Roubides. Transforming the delivery  
  of rural health care in Georgia: state partnership strategy for developing rural health  
  networks. Journal of Rural Health. 2003; 19(S), 361-371 
 
Morrissey, MA., J. Alexander, L.R. Burns, and V. Johnson. The effects of managed care on  
  physician and clinical integration in hospitals. Medical Care. 1999; 37: 350-361. 
 
Robinson, J.C. Physician-Hospital Integration and the Economic Theory of the Firm. Medical 
Care Research and Review. 1997. 54: 3-24. 
 
Rosenau, P.V. Performance evaluations of for-profit and nonprofit U.S. hospitals since  
  1980. Nonprofit Management and Leadership. 2003; 13(4): 401-423. 
 
Simon, H. A. Review of Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard 
to the Present and Beyond. in Journal of Economic Literature. 1992;30: 1503–05. 
 
Snail, T.S. and J.C. Robinson. Organization diversification in the American hospital.  
  Annual Review of Public Health. 1998; 19:417-53 
 
Williamson, O. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in  
  the Economics of Internal Organization. New York: Free Press, 1975, 286.   19 
 
Williamson, O.. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985. 
 
Williamson, O. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural 






Hybrid Control Hospital Physician  Shared











Hospital Physician Hospital 
Hybrid Control Hospital Physician  Shared











Hospital Physician Hospital 
Human Asset
Specificity 







SOURCE: Alexander et al.: 1996, “Organizational Approaches to Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems: A 
Taxonomic Analysis of Physician-organization Arrangements”, Medical Care Research and Review 53: 93.  
1PHO stands for a Physician-hospital organization (PHO) which represents a joint venture..
2 MSO stands for Management-services organization, which also is a joint venture.